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STUDENT COMMENTS
PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS OF DECEASED EXECUTIVES:
GIFT OR INCOME?
INTRODUCTION
In recent years many of America's widows have been involved in
judicial controversies with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The major
cause of their numerous affrays has been the Commissioner's endeavors to
include in the widows' federal income tax returns the amount of any payment
or payments which the corporations that employed their husbands in executive
capacities have voluntarily paid to the widows upon the death of their re-
spective husbands. Although there have been times when it appeared the
Commissioner was vacillating in his stand, the widows have been steadfast
in their attempts to procure judicial determination that such payments con-
stitute tax free gifts. The history, development and present status of this dis-
pute will comprise the subject matter of this Comment. The ultimate purpose
of this Comment, however, is to construct from the plethora of cases which
consider this problem useful criteria to guide the practicing lawyer who might
perchance have occasion to represent a bereaved widow in such a contest with
the Internal Revenue Service.
INCOME TAXATION OF PRE-1954 PAYMENTS
Although a substantial number of "widows' payments" cases have re-
ceived intensive judicial scrutiny in the last thirteen years, under the early
income tax regulations such payments had been relatively free from con-
sideration. One reason for this was a determination made in 1914, under
the Revenue Act of 1913, by the Treasury Department that:
When the monthly salary of an officer or employee is paid
for a limited period after his death to his widow in recognition of
the services rendered by her husband, no services being rendered
by the widow, it is held that such payment is a gratuity and exempt
from taxation under the income tax laws.'
In 1921 an Office Decision was issued which affirmed the 1914 stand. 2
In 1937 the case of Bogardus v. Commissioner3 was decided by the Supreme
Court. The opinion in Borgardus had an effect on almost every "widows'
payment" case which was thereafter decided. In that case the stockholders
of the Universal Oil Products Company caused assets valued at $4,000,000
to be withdrawn from the corporation and transferred to Unopco, a new
corporation. Later Universal's remaining assets were sold to a third corpora-
1 T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259 (1914).
2 O.D. 1017, 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921) said in part:
. . . a corporation paid . . . the widow of a deceased officer . . . (an)
amount equal to the salary he would have earned in two months. The pay-
ment was without consideration, a gratuity voted as a compliment to the
deceased . . . (3) the payment does not constitute taxable income.
3 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
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tion. All of the former stockholders of Universal became stockholders of
Unopco, with the same proportionate holdings. The stockholders of Unopco
then held a meeting at which it was proposed that a "gift or honorium" be
made to the employees of the Universal company as a token of appreciation
for their loyalty and support. None of the intended recipients had ever been
employed by Unopco.
In reversing a circuit court holding that the payments were taxable com-
pensation a majority of five of the Supreme Court held that the statutory
concepts of "gifts"4 and "compensation' 5 are mutually exclusive .° The
majority also felt that "A gift is none the less a gift because inspired by
gratitude for the past faithful service of the recipient." 7
 One of the most
important phrases in the opinion, however, was that which considered the
role which the parties' intention played in determining whether a transfer
was a tax free gift or taxable compensation. Mr. Justice Sutherland in speak-
ing for the majority commanded, ". . . intention must govern. . . ."8
 This
language was to become one of the controlling factors considered in "widows'
payments" cases.
It may well have been with the Bogardus wording in mind that the In-
ternal Revenue Service in 1939 promulgated an income tax ruling which said:
When an allowance is paid by an organization to which the
recipient has rendered no service the amount is deemed to be a gift
or gratuity and is not subject to federal income tax in the hands of
the recipient.°
This declaration served to reaffirm the position assumed by the Treasury
Department in 1914 and strengthened in 1921 by O.D. 1017.
It has been reportedi° that so many corporate employers began to rely
on Bogardus and I.T. 3329 in making payments to widows that in 1950 the
Commissioner, motivated by his historic concern for potential revenue losses,
felt he was forced to reverse his position. This decision was the basis for I.T.
4027" which states:
... that payments made by an employer to the widow of a deceased
officer or employee, in consideration of services rendered by the
officer or employee, are includable in the gross income of the widow
for federal tax purposes.
At this time it should be noted by the reader that whereas the earlier releases
of the Internal Revenue Service stressed the requirement that the recipient
4
 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(11)(3), 45 Stat. 791 (now Int.•Rev. Code of
1954, § 102).
5
 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(a), 45 ,Stat. 791 (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 61).
302 U.S. at 39.
7 Id. at 44.
8 Id. at 43.
I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153.
10
 Pelisck, Tax Treatment of Payments to The Widows of Corporate Officers and
Employees, 44 Marg. L. Rev. 16, 18 (1960).
11 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
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had rendered no services to the payor, 1.T. 4027 contained no such terminol-
ogy and, in effect, seems to have relegated this fact to an irrevelant position.
The Commissioner's determination to release I.T. 4027 may also have
been motivated by at least two additional circumstances. The first of these
was the opinions reported in the Sutra, 12 FlarSheiM 13 and Varnedoe14 cases.
Each of these cases involved the taxation of payments made to widows of
deceased employees. Although the payments in these cases were held to be
subject to the federal income tax, it is of controlling importance that in each
case the payments had been made pursuant to an enforceable legal obliga-
tion." Armed with these opinions, however, the Commissioner possibly felt
he could support his ruling.
The second circumstance which could have caused the Commissioner to
act was the decision in the April/ case,IG the first case which considered taxa-
tion of voluntary payments to widows. In that case the board of directors of
a corporation unanimously resolved to pay the widow of its deceased president
an amount which equalled his former salary "in recognition of the services
rendered by Mr. Aprill." The Commissioner advanced two theories as to why
these payments should be taxable income. First, he believed the payments
were compensation for previously performed services of the husband and,
second, that the payments were really distributions of profits (dividends),
the widow being the corporation's major stockholder. In holding the payments
to be gifts the Tax Court asserted that the purpose which motivated the
corporation was of controlling significance. The court also felt that the lan-
guage of the resolution which authorized the payments and the fact that the
payments were deducted as salary expenses on both the corporate books and
the tax returns were satisfactorily explained by the board's desire to com-
ply with I.T. 3329. The Commissioner's contention that the payments were
distributions of profits was quickly dismissed as being factually unsupport-
able. With the Commissioner and the Tax Court holding such diametrically
opposed views, future litigation was a certainty.
In the four years immediately following the birth of I.T. 4027 only
12 Su tro v. U.S., CC Fl 1942 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (42-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9523
(N,D. Cal. June 2, 1942). A widow of an employee of Standard Oil Company of
California received $100,000 under a voluntary life insurance plan which prokided for
payments to dependents of deceased employees. The court held that since an enforce-
able legal obligation existed in favor of the beneficiaries the payments were reportable
income, not gifts.
33 Flarsheim v. United States, 156 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946). A brokerage com-
pany, pursuant to an agreement entered into by the company and Mr. Flarsheim to
pay his widow a stated amount each year out of the . company's earnings, made the
payments to Mrs. Flarsheim, The court held (among other things) that the payments,
having been made under a legally enforceable contract, were taxable income in the
widow's hands.
14 Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946). The widow of an Atlanta,
Georgia fireman received a pension pursuant to Georgia statutes. The court held that
the payments were not gifts if made under a mandate of the legislature which is
legally enforceable by the beneficiary.
15 The beneficiary has a legal right to such payments, except in Massachusetts
which is a non-third party beneficiary state, under the theory of Lawrence v. Fox,
20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
16 Louise K. Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949) .
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four cases which considered the problem at hand were litigated." Not one
of these cases even recognized the existence of T.T. 4027 although in each
case voluntary payments to widows were construed as tax free gifts.
But defeating the effect of I.T. 4027 by completely ignoring it appeared
to be insufficient. In 1955 a widow squarely met and conclusively conquered
this still potent obstacle to tax freedom." The Tax Court, in deciding that
certain voluntary payments to a widow were tax free gifts, said of I.T. 4027:
"The respondent, obviously, cannot by administrative ruling tax as ordinary
income a payment which the payor made and intended as a gift."" Thus,
by this one sentence, any effect I.T. 4027 might have had in "widows'
payments" cases was successfully thwarted.
In 1951, a year after LT. 4027 was promulged, Congress amended
Section 22(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.20 The amendment
allowed one to exclude from reportable gross income for federal income tax
purposes payments received pursuant to any contract of an employer pro-
viding for such payments by reason of the death of the employee. The aggre-
gate amount excludable by the beneficiaries was limited to $5,000 per em-
ployer. This amendment affected payments made to widows after December
31, 1950. It should be noted that this amendment provided an exclusion from
gross income only for payments made pursuant to a contractual obligation.
Neither the Commissioner2 ' nor the courts22 construed the amendment as in
any way changing or modifying the status of gratuitous voluntary payments.
Sympathy for the despairing widows seems to have permeated the courts
11
 Marie G. Haskell, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1955); Estate of Ralph W. Rear-
don, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1955) ; Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308
(1954); Alice M. Macfarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952).
18
 Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
19
 Id. at 918.
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(1), as amended, ch. 521, § 302(a), 65 Stat.
459 (1951), says:
(1) Life Insurance, Etc.—Amounts Received—
(A) under a life insurance contract, paid by reason of the death of the
insured; or
(B) under a contract of an employer providing for the payment of such
amounts to the beneficiaries of an employee, paid by reason of the death of
the employee;
whether in a single sum or otherwise (but if such amounts are held by
the insurer, or the employer, under an agreement to pay interest thereon,
the interest payments shall be included in gross income). The aggregate
of the amounts excludable under subparagraph (b) by all the beneficiaries
of the employee under all such contracts of any one employer may not
exceed $5,000.
21 Crown, Payments To Corporate Executives' Widows, N.Y.U. 19th Inst. on Fed.
Tax 815, 831 (1961):
It is notable that the Commissioner did not construe the 1951 amendment
as affecting in any way the status of gratuitous payments. His regulations
made clear that the exclusion applied only to amounts paid pursuant to an
enforceable written contract between the employer and the deceased employee,
or pursuant to an established plan providing for payments to all employees
or special classes of employees. It is thus clear that the 1951 amendment did
not touch upon or affect employee-death-benefits qualifying as gifts.
22 See, e.g., Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Rodner v.
United States, 149 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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which decided the "widows' payments" cases that came under the purview
of the Internal Revenue Act of 1939, for nearly all of the cases favored the
widow's position. 25 An examination of the cases, however, reveals a veritable
hotchpotch of opinions, beliefs and legalistic reasoning. Even though the
cases established no concrete criteria which a corporation could rely on when
making payments to widows, it was quite easy to demonstrate that the pay-
ments should be considered tax free gifts. The widows, according to the
Florence S. Luntz case,24 had only to prove:
1. that the payments had been made to the wife of the deceased em-
ployee and not to his estate;
2. that there was no obligation on the part of the corporation to pay
any additional compensation to the deceased employee;
3. that the corporation derived no benefit from the payments;
4. that the wife of the deceased employee performed no services for the
corporation; and
5. that the services of the husband had been fully compensated.
Justice Brooks in Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. United States26 cites
three additional factors which he alleges the Tax Court considered. These
were:
A. what was the donor's motive (intention) in making the payments;
B. were the payments related to dividends or profits; and
C. was the recipient an officer, director or majority stockholder of the
payor-corporation?
Granting that the courts did consider all of the above-enumerated fac-
tors, it remained a matter of conjecture as to the weight which would be
accorded them. Any one element might be considered of major importance,
merely significant or relatively inconsequential by the different courts. 26 The
23 Bounds v. United States, supra note 22; Bankston v. United States, 254 F.2d
641 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Rodner v. United States, supra note 22; Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Florence S. Luntz,
29 T.C. 647 (1958) ; Estate of Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957); Estate of Arthur
W. Hellstrom, supra note 18; Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, supra note 17; Mary G.
Haskell, supra note 17; Ruth Hahn, supra note 17; Alice M. Macfarlane, supra note
17; Alice M. Aprill, supra note 16.
24 Supra note 23, at 650.
25 Supra note 23, at 547.
26 E.g., concerning the fact that the corporation deducted the payments on its
books and tax returns:
Simpson v, United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958) (relevant) ; Bausch's
Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951) (relevant) ; Estate of
Arthur W. Hellstrom, supra note 18 (no particular significance); Ruth Hahn,
supra note 17 (not as important as other factors); cf. Silverman v. Commis-
sioner, 253 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1958) (relevant).
Concerning the fact that the payments were made to the widow:
In only one case was the court sufficiently munificent to disregard that fact
that the payments were made to the deceased employee's estate instead of to
the widow. Estate of Frank J. Foote, supra note 23.
Concerning the fact that the payments were equal in amount to the decedent's salary:
Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, supra (relevant), Bounds v. United States,
supra note 23 (immaterial).
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courts even differed when considering whether the issue was one of fact, law,
or a mixed issue of law and fact. 27
Although a determination of this last posed issue was relatively un-
important per se, the scope of appellate review was contingent upon its
answer. If the question was one of fact the "clearly erroneous" standard
of review was the one to which the courts adhered: But if the question was
one of law or mixed fact and law, then a considerably wider standard of
review was applicable.
The Commissioner, as before mentioned, was met by so many adverse
court decisions28
 in cases involving voluntary payments to widows by their
deceased husbands' employers that on August 25, 1958 the Internal Revenue
Service issued T.I.R. 87 29 which said in part:
. . . it will no longer litigate, under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, cases involving the taxability of such payments unless there
is clear evidence that they were intended as compensation for
services, or where the payments may be considered as dividends....
The position of the Service with respect to cases in this area arising
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 involves other considera-
tions and will be made the subject of a future announcement.
INCOME TAXATION OF PRE-DUBERSTEIN CASES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
The enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 somewhat com-
plicated the widows' position. Section 101 of the 1954 Code° excluded from
reportable gross income for federal income tax purposes amounts received by
the beneficiaries of an employee from the decedent's employer if such amounts
are paid by reason of the death of the decedent-employee. The Code, however,
limits the aggregate amount excludable to $5,000. Thus, two substantial
changes were effected in the situation as it existed under the 1939 Code.
First, the aggregate amount excludable became $5,000—not $5,000 per em-
ployer. Secondly, and for our purposes the most important change, the 1939
Code qualification that the payment must be made pursuant to a contract in
27 Bogardus v. Commissioner, supra note 3 (the question is one of law or at
least a mixed question of fact and law); Bounds v. United States, supra note 22
(the question is one of law or at least a mixed question of fact and law); Bankston
v. United States, supra note 23 (the question is one of fact) ; Alice M. Macfarlane,
supra note 17 (the question is one of fact); Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, supra note
17 (the question is one of fact).
28 Supra note 23.
21) CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 6664 (1958).
3° Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101: Certain Death Benefits.
(b) Employee's Death Benefits.--
(1)General Rule.—Gross income does not include amounts received
(whether in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the
estate of an employee, if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of
an employer and are paid by reason of the death of the employee.
(2) Special Rules For Paragraph
(A) $5,000 Limitation.—The aggregate amounts excludable under
paragraph (1) with respect to the death of any employee shall
not exceed $5,000.
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order to be excludable was removed. This, ironically, made the widow's lot
more difficult.
While the Commissioner magnanimously conceded that the first $5,000
of all "death" payments were hereafter not subject to federal income taxation,
the widows found him quite ready to contest the taxability of all voluntary
payments in excess of the stated amount. Briefly, the Commissioner's argu-
ment was this--
The sections of the 1954 Code relating to exclusions from gross
income should be strictly construed. Since Congress provided for the
taxation of death benefits in Section 101 we should not consider any
voluntary "death" payments in excess of $5,000 as being protected
from taxation by Section 102. 31 Therefore, such excess should be
taxable income under the broad sweep of Section 61. 32
Dicta in two circuit court cases which were decided under the 1939 Code
supported the Commissioner's contention as to the 1954 Code construction. 33
The first "widows' payment" case which was decided under the pro-
visions of the 1954 Code was Reed v. United States. 34 In that case Mr.
Reed, an officer, director and minority stockholder of a corporation, died
after thirty years in its employ. In a resolution pursuant to which the
officer's widow received $37,500 the board of directors of the corporation
eulogistically spoke of their "deep sense of appreciation and recognition of
the past services of (the decedent)" and their desire that this payment be
"a material expression of sympathy and of kindness to (the widow). . ."
After finding that the corporation had no plan or policy of making pay-
ments," that the amounts were not paid in conformity with any obligation,
31
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102: Gifts and Inheritances.
(a) General Rule.—Gross income does not include the value of property ac-
quired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.
32 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61: Gross Income Defined.
(a) General Definition.—Except as otherwise provided	 . gross income
means all income from whatever source derived. . . .
33 Bounds v. United States, supra note 22, at 878 n.2:
While this controversy arises under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
the law has now been amended, and the problem with which we are here
concerned cannot arise in the future. The new law rejects the tests which
have been found unsatisfactory in practice and unequivocally makes nontax-
able payments to the employee's estate or family, made by reason of his
death; but it imposes a $5,000 limitation. The 1939 provision that the pay-
ments be made pursuant to contract has been eliminated from the 1954 Code.
Rodner v. United States, supra note 22, at 237:
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (not applicable here) changed this.
Section 101(b) . . eliminates the provisions limiting to contractual death
benefits the application of the $5,000 exemption. To me the effect of this
would seem to be to withdraw the complete exemption that gratuitous death
benefits had enjoyed and to substitute an exemption up to $5,000. In the
complete revision effected by the 1954 Code the general language exempting
gifts is controlled by the particular language of Section 101(b) limiting the
exemption of death benefits to $5,000. Gifts in general are exempt but gifts
in the form of death benefits are taxable insofar as they exceed $5,000.
34 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir.
1960).
35 See Simpson v, United States, supra note 26. A corporation made payments
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and that the decedent had been fully compensated for his endeavors, the
court found the payment to be a gift.
The Reed case is most significant because of its rather curt rebuff of
the Commissioner's above-outlined argument concerning taxation of that
portion of any voluntary "death" payments which exceeded $5,000. Judge
Shelbourne said:
Section 102(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 con-
tains the provision (as did the comparable section, 22(b) (3), of
the 1939 Code) that gross income does not include amounts re-
ceived as gifts; and the meaning of that provision is not changed
by the provisions of Section 101(b) of the 1954 Code. It is clear
that the purpose of the latter section of the 1954 Code is to elimi-
nate the requirement (contained in the comparable section
22(b) (2) of the 1939 Code) that certain employee death benefits
must be paid pursuant to a contractual obligation in order for such
benefits to qualify for a $5,000 exclusion from gross income."
Thus, the Commissioner's position was dealt a staggering blow by the
initial 1954 Code "death payment" case.
Six months after the District Court decision in Reed was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals the Internal Revenue Service published Revenue
Ruling 60-326. 37 Since the decision in the Reed case was contrary to the
Service's stand, they announced that the decision would not be followed
as a precedent in the future disposition of similar cases. Less than a year
and a half after the publication of Revenue Ruling 60-326 the Internal
Revenue Service in T.I.R. 3 7 las abandoned the position it had previously
taken. The Commissioner, perseveringly attentive when scrutinizing possible
revenue sources, had waited until five cases refused to accept his position"
before stating that widows might exclude the entire amount of voluntary
"death" payments if such payments qualify as a gift excludable under
Section 102(a) of the 1954 Code.
Other than the battle involving the various interpretations of Section
101 of the 1954 Code the posture of "widows' payments" cases remained
quite stagnant. The intention of the parties, as established by the Bogardus
decision, reigned as the single most important factor to be considered. The
other factors, as listed in the Luntz and Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.
cases, continued to be weighed differently by the courts. One can only
speculate as to what would have occurred or what final direction the cases
to a deceased officer's widow in conformity with a long established plan consistently
followed by the company. The court found that the corporation did derive a benefit
from making the payment in that it encouraged living executives to continue in
their employment by the corporation. Thus, the payments were taxable income to
the widow.
30 177 F. Supp. at 209.
37 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 32.
36 CCil 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 16,333.
39 United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962); Reed v. United States,
supra note 34; Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961) ; Wilner v.
United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. N.Y. 1961); Cowan v. United States, 191 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960),
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would have taken if left to be settled under the circumstances as they then
existed. But in June of 1960 the Duberstein-Stanton"-Kaisern triad was
decided by the Supreme Court.
DUBERSTEIN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Although none of the three cases cited above involved "widows' pay-
ments" directly they have been mentioned frequently in that problem area.
In Duberstein, the taxpayer gave to a corporation with which he had done
business information concerning potential customers of the corporation.
Since the information proved helpful the corporation presented Duberstein
with a Cadillac automobile as a gift. The Tax Court felt that the only
justifiable inference from the facts was that the automobile was intended
as remuneration for services rendered, and affirmed the Commissioner's as-
sessment of a deficiency. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 42 in reversing
the Tax Court found that the evidence clearly and distinctly demonstrated
that the Cadillac was a gift.
In Stanton, the taxpayer was the former president and comptroller of a
real estate subsidiary of the Trinity Church in New York. Upon his resig-
nation from these positions the church directors awarded him a $20,000
"gratuity" in appreciation of his past services. The payment, however, was
subject to the provision that he first release the church from all claims to
pension and retirement benefits not already accrued up to the date he
resigned. In a suit for refund of taxes paid, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in an unreported decision made
a simple finding that the, $20,000 payment was a gift. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals,43 basing its decision on the fact that the payment was
made "in appreciation" of his particular services and that Mr. Stanton al-
legedly released certain claims, reversed the trial court and found the pay-
ments to be taxable compensation.
In Kaiser, the taxpayer received financial assistance from a labor union
while out on strike. It was the union's policy to aid striking employees with-
out regard to the employee's union affiliations. The District Court entered
a judgment n.o.v. for the government on the ground that the financial
assistance was income as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals" reversed because they felt the jury's decision was supported by
the evidence and was within its purview as a trier of facts.
When these cases were on appeal to the Supreme Court the Commis-
sioner stepped forth with a proposal that the Court establish a new test
for the gift versus income controversies. He advocated that the Bogardus
decision, which is phrased in terms of the parties' intentions, would be
more effective if the Court determined that the "motive" instead of inten-
tion be considered. Moreover, the Commissioner suggested that gifts be
40
 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The Court decided Stanton
v. United States in the same opinion.
41 United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960). The same principles and rea-
soning as illuminated in the Duberstein case were involved in this decision.
42 Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir: 1959).
43 Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959).
44 Kaiser v. United States, 262 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958).
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defined as transfers of property made for personal as distinguished from
business reasons.
The Court, while expressly refusing to adopt the Commissioner's "mo-
tive" criterion,, did say ". . that the proper criterion, established by deci-
sion here, is one that inquires what the basic reason for his conduct was
in fact—the dominant reason that explains his action in making the trans-
fer."45
 (Emphasis added.) So it seems the Commissioner "lost the battle
of semantics, but won his point on clarification.""
Admittedly the Duberstein decision does not establish the definite stand-
ards which the Commissioner sought. However, the Court did make some
oft reiterated and frequently helpful statements. Some of these were:
1'. The statute does not use the term "gift" in the common law sense,
but in a more colloquial sense.
2. A voluntarily executed transfer of property by one to another, even
though not pursuant to a legal or moral obligation, is not neces-
sarily a statutory "gift." 47
3. When a payment proceeds primarily from the constraining force
of a legal or moral duty, or from anticipated benefit to the payor,
it is not a gift. 48
4. If the transfer is in return for services rendered, it is immaterial
that the payor is not economically benefited."
5. A gift in the statutory sense proceeds from a detached and disin-
terested generosity 30
 arising out of affection, respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses. 51
6. The question is basically one of fact for determination on a case
by case basis.
Thus, the Court did conclusively settle one disputed point—whether the
issue was one of fact, law, or mixed fact and law. Now, the scope of
judicial review was clear. If a jury sat as fact finder, the inquiry on the
appellate level was whether reasonable men would differ with its conclu-
sions. When the trial was before a judge only the judge's findings could
not be overturned unless "clearly erroneous."52
45 Supra note 40, at 286.
46 Crown, supra note 21, at 819.
47
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
48 Bogardus v. Commissioner, supra note 3.
49
 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952). Here, a contest winner was
held to have received taxable income when he accepted a cash award for a prize
composition.
69
 Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 251 U.S. 243 (1956)..
Gi Robertson v. United States, supra note 49.
62 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that the findings of fact by a district court in
a nonjury case shall nat be set aside unless clearly. erroneous. Int. Rev. Code of 1954
§ 7482 gives the United States Courts of Appeal exclusive jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Tax Court in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions
of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury. United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948), explains that a finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. This rule also applies to factual inferences from undisputed basic facts.
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The Court then applied these principles to the cases immediately
before it for disposition. As for Duberstein, the Court could not say that
the Tax Court's conclusion that the Cadillac was recompense for past
services, or an inducement to be of service in the future, was clearly
erroneous. The Court held that the findings of fact at the trial level in
the Stanton case were so sparse that they could not determine what facts
or legal standard the lower court had considered relevant. Appropriately,
the Court remanded the case for new and adequate findings of fact. As
for Kaiser, the Court felt the evidence supported the jury's decision and
affirmed the court of appeals.
A realistic examination of the many cases which have passed through
the courts since the Duberstein decision was handed down has revealed—
to this writer—no major change in the tribunals' treatment of "widows'
payments" cases. This position is not without support, for dicta in two
district court cases reveals that others are inclined to accept this view. 53
The factors which were considered in the pre-Duberstein cases have been
and are still subject to inquiry in the post-Duberstein controversies, to wit:
1. Was the payment made directly to the widow;
2. Was the payor under a moral or legal obligation to make the pay-
ment;
3. Was the payor benefited by making the payment;
4. Did the widow perform any services for the payor;
5. Was the decedent fully compensated during his lifetime;
6. What was the payor's motive;
7. Was the widow a shareholder of the corporation (were the pay-
ments related to dividends or profits) ; and
8. Was there a plan or policy of making payments to widows of
deceased officers?
It appears, however, that since Duberstein one new factor has received
judicial consideration. An inquiry has been made into whether or not the
board of directors when authorizing the payments had knowledge of the
financial condition of the widow. But even this fact is weighed differently
by the courts.54 Although the courts have inquired into this aspect since
53 Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 1962):
The Supreme Court in Duberstein did not destroy the authority of the
earlier Tax Court cases and the guides enunciated in them for discovering moti-
vation. The plea addressed by the Government to the Supreme Court in
Duberstein to establish a new test defining 'gift' was expressly rejected. The
Court limited itself to summarizing earlier decisions as to which particular
dominant motivations, when adequately supported by the evidence, result in
income treatment, and which result in gift treatment.
Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223, 226 (E.D. Wis. 1961):
It is the opinion of this court that Duberstein reaffirms previous principles
rather than proposes new rules governing the determination whether corporate
transfers constituted gifts for the purposes of the I.R.C.
54 Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962) (widow's
need not mentioned by court); United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir.
1960) (widow's need not 'mentioned by court); Canning v. United States, CCH 1962
Stand, Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9593 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 1962) (the
court, while holding a payment to be a tax free gift, merely mentioned that the board
•
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the Duberstein decision, it appears that this is just a natural step in the
evolution of factors receiving consideration and is in no way connected
with the Duberstein case itself.
The proper choice of forum in which the widow's attorney should en-
deavor to have his case heard has become extremely important since Duber-
stein established that the issue was one of fact, and thus subject to reversal
by an appellate court using the aforementioned standards of review. Re-
garding this it is notable that (of the cases found by this writer) the Tax
Court in the last ten cases has been unanimous in holding that corporate
payments are income in the widows' hands." Five of these Tax Court cases
were appealed. The reviewing courts have reversed two," affirmed two, 57
and remanded one so that the parties could plead to additional factors which
were considered relevant subsequent to the filing of the original stipulation
of facts.r's In the district courts the widows have been more fortunate. In
seven cases it has been held that the widows received tax free gifts," while
only in two have they been held to have received taxable income." Two of
the cases which the widows won were appealed—both were affirmedP Thus,
as a practical matter, it appears that the best procedure would be to pay the
assessed tax and sue for a refund in the proper district court.
CONCLUSION
Although many of the post-Duberstein decisions have been contrary
to the widows' position—when compared with the copious pre-Duberstein
of directors knew the widow was not financially secure); Rice v. United States, supra
note 53 (court maintained gifts can be made to financially secure persons).
55 Estate of Louis Rosen, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 316 (1962); Margaret H. D.
Penick, 37 T,C. No, 98 (Feb. 27, 1962); Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem, 1144 (1961); Roy I. Martin, 36 T.C. No. 56 (June 21, 1961); Mildred W.
Smith, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961); Estate of Irving Cooper, 20 CCH Tax Ct,
Mem. 774 (1961); Estate of W. R. Olsen, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem, 807 (1961); Mary
Fischer, 20 CCH TaX Ct. Mem. 318 (1961) ; Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr., 19 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960) ; Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960).
56 Olsen's Estate v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (1962), reversing 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 807 (1961); Kuntz' Estate v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (1962), reversing
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960).
57
 Martin v. Commissioner, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)
9575 (3d Cir. June 28, 1962), affirming 36 T.C. No. 56 (June 21, 1961); Smith v.
Commissioner, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9574 (3d Cir.
June 28, 1962), affirming 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961).
58 Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir, 1962), remanding 35 T.C.
65 (1960),
50
 Pixton v. United States, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)
9686 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 1962) ; Palmer v. Mathis, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2
U.S. Tax Cas.) 9636 (F.D. Ark. June 21, 1962); Vaughn v. United States, CCH 1962
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9688 (S.D. Ga. May 3, 1962); Canning v.
United States, supra note .54; Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis.
1961); United States v. Frankel, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961); United States v,
Kasynski, unreported District Court case.
GO Heir'
 v. United States, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)
9564 (E.D, Wis, June 7, 1962); Gaugler v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
el United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962), affirming 192 F. Supp.
776 (ID. Minn. 1961) ; United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960),
affirming the unreported District Court case. supra note 59.
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cases which favored the widows' stand—there appears to be no logical
reason to support the courts' changed attitude. Duberstein is reputed to
have changed the major factor to be considered for the parties' actions
from "intention" to "dominant reason." But whether in practical law this
is a real change or just an academic argument in semantics is a matter of
conjecture.
It is this writer's opinion that the only reason for the many decisions
adverse to a holding of tax free gifts is a stress by the courts on that
portion of the evidence which would conflict with a "gift" holding. It
could be that the tenor of the Duberstein case is responsible for this changed
atmosphere. A search for a logical explanation for the change is hopelessly
fruitless. .
The decisions, however, do furnish the practicing attorney with certain
procedures he can follow and circumstances he can consider when a corpora-
tion wishes to make a tax free gift to a deceased officer's widow. These are:
1. Provide in the corporate resolution which authorizes the payments
to the widow that the payment be made directly to the widow;
2. Be certain the widow is to perform no services in return for the
payments to be made;
3. Pay any amounts due and owing to the decedent to his estate,
not to the widow;
4. Be certain the payments are in no way related to dividends or
profits (if the widow is a shareholder of the corporation);
5. Be certain the payments are in no way related to the decedent's
former salary;
6. Ascertain whether the payor has had a plan or policy of making
payment to widows of deceased executives;
7. Stress in a eulogistically worded resolution which makes no refer-
ence to the decedent's services to the corporation that the corpora-
tion is under no obligation to make the payments and that it expects
no benefit from doing so; and
8. Record in the minutes of the board of directors' meeting any find-
ings or opinion which the board has concerning the widow's finan-
cial situation. But if the widow is financially secure, stress the fact
that the board wishes to make a gift payment to her anyway.
If any one or more of the above listed items do not favor the widows'
position—and the payor wishes to make a tax free gift to her—stress those
factors which would support such a desire. As the situation now stands in
this problem area, the courts can stress either those facts which are favorable
to the widow or those which support the Commissioner's position, and, in
either case, reach a conclusion which would not be manifestly unreasonable,
for in the majority of "widows' payments" cases the factual picture is
flexible enough to be used in support of both arguments.
Although this situation might appear to be unreasonable and tend to
increase the number of cases, it is submitted by this writer that the holding
in the Duberstein case that the issue is one of fact to be decided on a
case to case basis is quite reasonable. Further Congressional amendment
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of the income tax laws might only lead to a greater confusion in the con-
struction and application of the already voluminous tax code. Also, since
the factors which receive judicial consideration are many and varied, any
statute concerning them would of necessity be quite complex—and perhaps
unwieldly. The distinction between gifts and income in the "widows' pay-
ments" cases turns primarily on the factual pattern and, in the opinion of
this writer, it is for this very reason that the Duberstein mandate should
prevail. Although the courts may differ, a solution which would satisfy all
parties concerned appears to be impossible.
DAVID W. CARROLL
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